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JURISDICTION STATEMENT 
Pursuant to U.C.A §78A-4-103(2)(e), the Utah Co i^rt of Appeals has jurisdiction 
of this matter, inasmuch as it is an appeal from a court of record in a criminal case not 
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the State lack jurisdiction to prosecute the Defendant? Jurisdiction is a 
question of law, subject to a correction of error standard, i^nd according no particular 
deference to the trial court. Skokos v. CorradinL 900 P.24 539, 541 (Utah App. 1995). 
This was the subject of a specific motion, hearing, and order. 090-130,143-156. 
2. Did the trial court err by imposing sanctions on defense counsel? Rule 11 
sanctions are subject to a three-tiered analysis: "(1) findings of fact are reviewed under 
the clearly erroneous standard; (2) legal conclusions are reviewed under the correction of 
error standard; and (3) the type and amount of sanction to|be imposed is reviewed under 
an abuse of discretion standard." Morse v. Packer, 15 P.3^ 1021, 1025,2000 UT 86, ^16. 
This was the subject of a specific motion, hearing, and order. 149-156,159-161, 167-186. 
3. Did the presiding judge err in failing to disqualify Judge A. Lynn Payne from 
hearing the case? Whether a trial court erred in failing to disqualify a judge under Rule 
29(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is a question of law, reviewed for 
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correctness, and according no particular deference to the trial court. State v. Alonzo. 973 
P.2d 975,979 (Utah 1998). This was the subject of a specific motion and order. 012-031, 
035-036,039-041. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Article VI, ^ [2, United States Constitution: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
Article III, §2, Utah Constitution: 
The people inhabiting this State do affirm and declare that they 
forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying 
within the boundaries hereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned 
or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, and that until the title thereto shall 
have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain 
subject to the disposition of the United States, and said Indian lands shall 
remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the 
United States. 
Rule 3.1, Utah Rules of Professional Conduct: 
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or 
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing 
so that is not frivolous, which includes a good-faith argument for an 
extension, modification or reversal of existing law. 
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Rule 3.3(a), Utah Rules of Professional Conduct: 
A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling 
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the 
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 3,2004, Petitioner, Petitioner J.D. Cla^k, who was 16 at the time, was 
involved in an altercation at Rock Creek Ranch in Ducheine County, Utah. He, his sister, 
and his girlfriend were attending a party at which drugs aiid alcohol were being con-
sumed. As Mr. Clark and the two women were attempting to leave, they were attacked by 
several intoxicated persons. In Mr. Clark's attempt to defend his sister and girlfriend, the 
intoxicated nephew of a county sheriffs deputy received multiple stab wounds. 003-006. 
Mr. Clark was originally charged by information iri Utah's Eighth District Court 
with several charges, included attempted murder. The cas^ was dismissed and refiled as a 
petition in Utah's Eighth District Juvenile Court, but after two years of litigation was 
dismissed, and on November 28, 2006, was again filed against Mr. Clark as an adult in 
the Eighth District Court where it was assigned to Judge A. Lynn Payne. 003-006. 
On December 7,2006, Mr. Clark moved to have Ji^ dge Payne disqualified due to 
his long and well-documented hostility toward the Uintah Indians. 012-031. The motion 
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was denied on January 22,2007 (039-041), and on Februaiy 12,2007, Mr. Clark filed a 
petition with the Utah Supreme Court requesting permission to challenge the trial court's 
interlocutory order denying disqualification. 046-047. On February 15,2007, the petition 
was assigned by the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals (052), and on 
April 13,2007, the Court of Appeals denied the petition. 071. 
On October 29,2007, the State invited Mr. Clark to file a motion challenging the 
jurisdiction of the trial Court. 087-089. On December 12,2007, Mr. Clark moved the 
court to dismiss the action against him on the grounds that the State could not exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over a member of a non-terminated tribe for acts committed on 
Indian land. 090-130. On April 22,2008, the State court denied the motion, and ordered 
that Mr. Clark's counsel be sanctioned for failing to acknowledge that a ruling of the 
Utah Supreme Court must take priority over the federal caselaw cited by Mr. Clark in 
support of his motion. 149-156. A hearing was held on May 12,2008, and on June 19, 
2008, the trial court sanctioned Mr. Clark's counsel the sum of $700.159-161,167-186. 
On November 10,2008, Mr. Clark entered a plea to a reduced charge of 
Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony. 206-217. On March 2,2009, a prison sentence 
of zero to five years was suspended and he was placed on six years (!) probation, ordered 
to serve 125 days in the Duchesne County Jail, and ordered to pay restitution. 225-231. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS- HISTORICAL 
1. On October 3,1861, the Uinta Valley Indian re$ervation was created by 
executive order of President Abraham Lincoln. Congress confirmed this Order on May 5, 
1864, stating that the Uinta Valley was "set apart for the permanent settlement and 
exclusive occupation of such of the different tribes of Ind^ns of said [Utah] territory as 
may be induced to inhabit the same." Act of May 5,1864J ch. 57,13 Stat 64.103. 
2. The Department of the Interior thereupon set upthe Uinta Agency to manage the 
affairs of the Uinta Valley Reserve. Those Indians who wfere located in the Uinta Valley 
and came under the jurisdiction of the Agency became kn^wn as the "Uintah Band." Few 
if any members of the Uintah Band were ethnically Ute. 103. 
3. In 1881, the Whiteriver Band and the Uncompalfgre Utes were brought under 
military escort to Utah from Colorado. 103. 
4. The Uintah Band has always maintained a distinctly different culture and 
lifestyle from the other two bands. This included intermaitiage with other tribes and non-
Indians, and a higher standard of living and education. Thb Utes: A forgotten People. 
Wilson Rockwell (Sage Books, Denver, 1956), pp. 255-2^6,262-263. Accordingly, the 
Uintah Band has always been known throughout the reservation as the "Mixed-bloods." 
104. 
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5. In 1937, the three bands occupying the reservation united under a single 
constitution as 'the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation/' The tribal 
constitution recognizes that the confederated Ute Indian Tribe consists of the Uintah, 
Whiteriver, and Uncompahgre bands. Preamble and Article III, §2, Ute Constitution. The 
tribal government consists of an equal number of representatives from each of the three 
bands. 104. 
6. Congress has recognized the separate existence of the individual bands 
subsequent to adoption of the tribal constitution. See, e.g., Act of July 14,1956, Pub.L. 
717, ch. 603, 70 Stat. 546. 104. 
7. Nothing in the Ute tribal constitution confers upon the confederated Ute Tribe 
any power to determine the membership of the individual bands. 104. 
8. Until 1956, no roll of the entire Ute Indian Tribe was ever created. Up to that 
time, each of the three bands kept their own separate rolls. 104. 
9. In 1956, the Ute Tribe expelled three quarters of the membership of the Uintah 
Band from the Ute Tribe. At that time, 208 members of the Uintah Band (23.6%) were 
placed on a newly-created roll of the entire Ute Tribe mandated by the Ute Partition Act 
of August 27,1954,68 Stat. 868,25 U.S.C. §§677-677aa {hereinafter "UPA"). 455 
members (51.5%) were placed on a separate termination roll mandated by the same act. 
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Another 220 members of the Uintah Band (24.9%) who \lvere living in 1956 were 
excluded from both Ute rolls, and were subsequently precluded from membership in the 
Ute Tribe. In total, the Ute Tribe expelled 76.4% of the Membership of the Uintah Band 
from the Ute Tribe. 104-105. 
10. There is no mention of the Uintah Band in the KJPA. 104-105. 
FACTS - LEGISLATIVE AND ADJtJDICATIVE 
A. Tribal Government 
11. Prior to 1937, the Uneompahgre Ute, the Uintaih, and the Whiteriver bands 
each had a traditional form of tribal government. The government of the Uintah Band 
consisted of a meeting of clan elders. 
12. Under the Wheeler-Howard Act of June 18,19^4 (48 Stat. 984), better known 
as the Indian Reorganization Act (hereinafter "IRA"), tribal lands were to be restored to 
Indian tribes, but only if they adopted a constitution approved by the Secretary of the 
Interior. 25 U.S.C. §463. Many tribes refused to do so, considering it an affront to their 
culture. 
13. In 1937, under heavy pressure from the Bureau | of Indian Affairs, the three 
bands occupying the reservation adopted a constitution as the Ute Indian Tribe of the 
Uintah and Ouray Reservation. The constitution had been ftvritten for the tribe by the 
s 
Bureau. The constitution did not acknowledge any form of traditional tribal government 
whatsoever. However, neither did the constitution abolish any such traditional 
governments. 104. 
14. After the expulsion of the Uintah Band from the Ute Tribe in 1956, the Uintah 
Band continued to consist of clans represented by clan elders, as it had prior to adoption 
of the 1937 Ute tribal constitution. 
B. Congressional Intent 
15. The intent of Congress as stated in the UPA was as follows: 
a. That termination of federal supervision over the so-called "mixed-
bloods" would take place in conjunction with termination of the "full-bloods," 
which would be undertaken in short order. 25 U.S.C. §§677, 677w; 
b. That the so-called "mixed-bloods," would receive a percentage share in 
the tribal assets. 25 U.S.C. §§677h-677i; 
c. That any interest the so-called "mixed-bloods" might receive in 
indivisible assets of the tribe would be inheritable, 25 U.S.C. §677i; and 
d. That those terminated from federal supervision under the UPA would 
gain some sort of advantage as United States citizens, previously unavailable, by 
abandoning their tribal heritage. 25 U.S.C. §677v. 
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16. The "full-blood" Utes were never terminated ifc>m federal supervision. 
17. The vast bulk of the assets presumably awarded to the "mixed-bloods" under 
the UPA in short order came back under the ownership of the Ute Tribe. See 
Termination's Legacy: The Discarded Indians of Utah. Rj Warren Metcalf, University of 
Nebraska Press, 2002; The Dispossessed: Cultural Genocide of the Mixed-blood Utes. 
Parker M. Nielson, University of Oklahoma Press, 1998. j\pp. B, p. 8. See also Fire on 
the Plateau: Conflict and Endurance in the American Southwest Charles Wilkinson, 
Island Press, 1999, ch. 8, "Uintah," pp. 148-171. 
18. Interests in indivisible assets have been held to|be non-inheritable. United 
States v. Murdoch 132 F.3d 534, 540 (10th Cir. 1997). 
19. Those terminated under the UPA have gained c(o advantages from the act, 
instead being condescended to as outcasts and "half-breeds" by the white community, 
while at the same time being excluded from their sacred tribal rights and heritage by the 
Ute Tribe. Fifty-plus years of torturous litigation is hardly |a "benefit" of citizenship. See 
Metcalf, Nielson, Wilkinson, supra. 
20. The policy of termination has been firmly renounced by Congress and the 
Executive, commencing with President Richard Nixon's Special Message to the Congress 
on Indian Affairs in 1970. Pub. Papers 564 (Richard M. N}xon, July 8,1970). 104. 
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21. Congress' intent in regard to termination is clear and unambiguous. P.L. 103-
454, Sec. 103(5) states: "Congress has expressly repudiated the policy of terminating 
recognized Indian tribes, and has actively sought to restore recognition to tribes that 
previously have been terminated." Act of Nov. 2,1994,108 Stat. 4791. 
22. Those tribes not explicitly restored to federal recognition by acts of Congress 
have been restored through the federal courts, usually due to lack of Due Process in the 
termination process. P.L. 103-454, Sec. 103(3). The Uintah Band remains the only tribe 
affected by termination era legislation that remains excluded from federal recognition.1 
23. The termination policy has never been construed to extend to termination of 
tribal existence or identity. See Menominee Tribe v. United States. 391 U.S. 404, 88 S.Ct. 
1705,20 L.Ed.2d 697 (1968). 
24. In short, the policy objectives of the UPA have failed, the conditions precedent 
of the UPA have not been met, the policy of termination itself has been expressly 
abandoned and repudiated by Congress, numerous termination acts have been invalidated 
1
 "Fourteen tribal termination acts were passed between 1954 and 1962. Michael 
C. Walch, Note, Terminating the Indian Termination Policy, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1181, 
1187 (1983). By 1983, recognition had been restored to six of the tribes affected by these 
acts. Id. By late 1994, only the Mixed Blood Utes were unsuccessful in achieving 
restoration of their tribal status." L. Scott Gould, The Congressional Response to Duro v. 
Reina: Compromising Sovereignty and the Constitution. 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 53, 57, 
n. 8 (1994). 
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by the courts, and the termination policy itself was never construed to extend to the 
obliteration of tribal existence or identity. 
C. Territorial Jurisdiction 
25. In 1983, a panel of the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Uintah 
and Ouray Reservation had been reduced to a fraction of its former area. Ute Indian Tribe 
of Uintah & Ourav Reservation v. Utah. 716 F.2d 1298 (^0* cir. l9S3Xhereinafter\M 
ID-
26. In 1985, the same court, sitting en banc, overturned the 1983 ruling in Ute II 
and held that exclusive tribal and federal criminal jurisdiction extended to the entire 
reservation within the original exterior boundaries. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray 
Reservation v.Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. en banc 1985), cert denied, 479 U.S. 994, 
107 S.Ct. 596, 93 L.Ed.2d 596 {\9U\hereinafter Utelll^ 
27. In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the exterior boundaries of the 
reservation had been reduced. However, the Supreme Cou)rt did not state to what extent 
those boundaries had been reduced. Hagen v. Utah. 510 U^S. 399, 114 S.Ct. 958, 127 
L.Ed.2d 252 (1994). 
28. In 1997, the 10th Circuit, again sitting en banc, fyeld that the exterior boundaries 
had only been reduced to the extent that lands had actually been homesteaded under the 
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1902-1905 acts which opened the reservation to settlement. The court gave explicit 
instructions as to how jurisdiction was to be determined on a case-by-case basis, and 
placed the burden to establish State jurisdiction in each such case upon the State of Utah. 
Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ourav Reservation v. Utah. 114 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1997), 
{hereinafter UteV). 
29. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari to review the 10th 
Circuit's holding in UteV. The court's holding in that case thus remains the law binding 
upon the State of Utah. See Article III, §2, Utah Constitution. UteV. 522 U.S. 1107,118 
S.Ct 1034,140L.Ed.2d 101 (1998). 105-106. 
30. The trial court does not consider itself bound by the holding in either Ute III or 
UteV. instead recognizing only the reservation boundaries described in the vacated 
holding of UteJI. 149-156. 
FACTS - THE APPELLANT 
31. Mr. Clark is a member of the Uintah Band of Indians. 105. 
32. The offenses with which Mr. Clark was charged are alleged to have occurred at 
Rock Creek Ranch in Duchesne County. 105. 
33. Rock Creek Ranch is within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray 
Indian Reservation. 105. 
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34. Rock Creek Ranch has never constituted a homestead or townsite under the 
1902-1905 Acts of Congress. 105. 
FACTS - JUDGE A. LYNN P^YNE 
35. Judge Payne has a long history of animosity toward the Uintah Band, and this 
has been and is being addressed in numerous cases. 012-031. State v. Valdez. 65 P.3d 
1191 (Utah App. 2003); State v. Reber et aL 2005 UT A^p 485, reversed, 2007 UT 36, 
171 P.3d 406, cert denied, Reber v. Utah. 552 U.S. 990, J28 S.Ct. 490,169 L.Ed.2d 339 
(2007); Atkins v. Pavne. Case no. 2:08cv52 (D. Utah, Kimball, J.); Reber v. Payne. Case 
no. 2:08cv50 (D. Utah, Stewart, J.); Clark v. Pavne. Case Ho. 2:08cv377 (D. Utah, 
Campbell, J.), ajfd and dismissed, Case no. 09-4004 (10^ Cir. July 9,2009). 
36. Anticipating Judge Payne's hostility toward any effort to address jurisdiction, 
Mr. Clark moved on December 7,2006, to have Judge Payne disqualified. 012-031. 
37. The motion to disqualify was denied on January 22,2007. 039-041. 
38. On February 12,2007, Mr. Clark petitioned the| Utah Supreme Court under 
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure seeking permission for an interlocutory 
appeal of the trial court's order denying disqualification. $ee case no. 20070127. 046-047. 
39. The Utah Supreme Court assigned the petition t0 the Utah Court of Appeals 
on February 15,2007 (050-051), where is was denied on J\pnl 13,2007. 071. 
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FACTS - APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
40. On April 24,2007, the Utah Supreme Court issued its opinion in State v. Reber 
etaL 2007 UT 36,171 P.3d 406. 
41. On July 23,2007, the members of the Uintah Band petitioned the United States 
Supreme Court for certiorari review of the Utah Supreme Court's Reber ruling. 
Unfortunately, the High Court denied certiorari on October 29,2007. 552 U.S. 990,128 
S.Ct.490,169L.Ed.2d339. 
42. On the same day, October 29,2007, the State invited Mr. Clark to file a motion 
challenging jurisdiction. All parties understood that, in light of the disposition of the 
Reber petition before the U.S. Supreme Court, Mr. Clark would be creating a record in 
his own case in order to mount a good faith challenge to the Utah Supreme Court's 
holding in Reber. 087-089. 
43. On December 12,2007, Mr. Clark filed a with the trial court a Motion to 
Dismiss and supporting memorandum. Mr. Clark's memorandum set forth the appropriate 
federal constitutional, statutory, and case law provisions supporting Mr. Clark's Indian 
status. 090-130. 
44. On February 22,2008, the State filed a Response to Mr. Clark's Motion to 
Dismiss. 143-145. The entire response consisted of a citation to the Utah Supreme 
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Court's ruling in State v. Reber. 2007 UT 36,171 P.3d 406, cert denied, 552 U.S. 990, 
128 S.Ct. 490,169 L.Ed.2d 339 (2007). 144. 
45. At oral argument on the motion to dismiss, Mr. Clark explicitly stated his 
belief that the federal authorities cited in the motion to dispiiss contravene and supersede 
the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Reber. 273. 
46. On April 22,2008, the trial court denied Mr. Clark's motion to dismiss, and 
found Mr. Clark's counsel in contempt of court for failing to cite the Reber ruling in the 
motion to dismiss. 155. 
47. On May 12,2008, Mr. Clark's counsel demonstrated to the trial court that 
under Rule 3.3(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, it was sufficient that the 
State had cited the Reber case in its response to Mr. Clark's motion to dismiss. Moreover, 
Counsel had explicitly addressed Reber during oral argument on April 8,2008.272. 
48. On June 19,2008, notwithstanding Rule 3.3(a)(^ 2), the trial court sanctioned 
Mr. Clark's counsel $700.00, apparently for failing to agree with the Reber ruling, let 
alone cite it. 167-186. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
L The State cannot exercise criminal jurisdiction over a member of a federally 
recognized Indian tribe for acts committed on an Indian reservation. The acts Mr. Clark 
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are alleged to have committed took place on Indian land, and Mr. Clark is a member of 
the Uintah Band of Indians. The Uintah Band constituted a federally recognized Indian 
tribe prior to 1937, and was expelled en masse from the confederated Ute Tribe in 1956. 
However, notwithstanding the Uintah Band was expelled from the Ute confederacy, it 
was never terminated from federal supervision. 
II. The status of the Uintah Band is an issue that will eventually be decided in the 
federal courts. However, in order to challenge a state court proceeding in the federal 
courts, it is necessary to raise the federal issues in the state proceeding. The State's Reber 
ruling has no binding effect on the federal courts. However, in order for Mr. Clark to 
bring a federal certiorari or habeas corpus challenge to his state prosecution, he must 
raise the federal issues at the trial level. When he did so, the trial court sanctioned him. 
The sanctions had no legal basis under the relevant Rules of Professional Conduct. 
III. Judge A. Lynn Payne has repeatedly manifested his hostility not only toward 
the Uintah Band and its members, but even toward the very mention of the Uintah Band 
in his court. Uintah Band members have repeatedly and emphatically sought to draw this 
to the attention of both the State and federal courts. Mr. Clark timely attempted to have 
Judge Payne removed from this case as well, and the subsequent course of proceedings 
demonstrates that this motion was well-founded, and should have been granted. 
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ARGUMENT 
L The State has no jurisdiction to prosecute Mr, Clark 
It is well-established that "[wjithin Indian country, state jurisdiction is limited to 
crimes by non-Indians against non-Indians,... and victimless crimes by non-Indians." 
Solemv.Bartlett.465U.S.463,465,n.2,104 S.Ct 1161,, 1163,n.2,79L.Ed.2d443 
(1984)(Internal citations omitted). Under 18 U.S.C. §§1152 and 1153, the offenses 
alleged against Mr. Clark fall under exclusive federal and tribal jurisdiction. 
Article VI of the United States Constitution states ih pertinent part: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the Uniteki States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
Article III, §2, of the Utah Constitution states: 
The people inhabiting this State do affirm and declare that they 
forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying 
within the boundaries hereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned 
or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, and that until the title thereto shall 
have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain 
subject to the disposition of the United States, and said Indian lands shall 
remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control qfthe Congress of the 
United States. (Emphasis added) 
"[T]he protection that federal law, treaties, and statytes extend to Indian occupancy 
is 'exclusively the province of federal law.'99 Wilson v. Onfoha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. at 
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670-671,99 S.Ct at 2539. Under the well-established canons of construction of federal 
Indian law, Mr. Clark is a member of a federally recognized tribe that has merely been 
omitted from the list mandated under 25 U.S.C. §479a. Under both the federal and Utah 
constitutions, this federal law is binding upon the Respondent. Accordingly, the State of 
Utah had no jurisdiction to prosecute Mr. Clark. 
A. The alleged offense took place within Indian country as defined bv federal law. 
All lands within the Uintah Valley Reservation that were not homesteaded under 
the 1902-1905 Acts of Congress2 remain Indian country as defined under 28 U.S.C. 
§1151, and are subject to exclusive tribal and federal jurisdiction. Ute Indian Tribe of 
Uintah & Ourav Reservation v. Utah. 114 F.3d 1513,1529 (10th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 
522 U.S. 1107,118 S.Ct 1034, 140L.Ed.2d 101 (1998). Specifically, the 10th Circuit 
held that when jurisdiction over tribal lands is challenged, the burden rests upon the State 
to provide a patent demonstrating that the location in question is on land home-steaded 
under the 1902-1905 Acts of Congress. 14 at 1530. Unless and until the State provides 
such a patent, the land presumptively remains under exclusive tribal and federal 
jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the issue was explicitly raised before the trial court (105-
2Act of May 27,1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 263, Joint Resolution of June 19,1902, 
Resolution No. 31, 32 Stat 744, Act of March 3,1903, ch. 994, 32 Stat 997, Act of Apr. 21, 
1904, ch. 1402,33 Stat. 189,207-08, Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479,33 Stat 1069. 
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106), the State to date has never provided a patent demonstrating that Rock Creek Ranch 
was homesteaded under the 1902-1905 legislation. The location was thus within Indian 
country, subject to exclusive tribal and/or federal jurisdiction, and the sole question 
remaining pertains to Mr. Clark's individual Indian status^ 
B. The Reber case distinguished. 
Mr. Clark's petition before the district court set forfe facts indicating that 76.4% of 
the Uintah Band membership was expelled from the Ute Tfribe in 1956.104-105. Mr. 
Clark's allegations raised the questions: (1) How could th$ Ute Tribe expel three quarters 
of the Uintah Band from its midst without expelling the Uintah Band itself from the Ute 
Tribe? and (2) Having been thus expelled, how could the itfintah Band as a political unit 
be terminated from federal supervision when it is nowhere mentioned in the UPA? 
The trial court did not address these questions, holding merely that the matter had 
been resolved by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Rebet 2007 UT 36,171 P.3d 406, 
cert denied, 552 U.S. 990,128 S.Ct. 490, 169 L.Ed.2d 334 (2007). 151-152. However, 
the Utah Supreme Court in Reber had done no more than apply its own reading of United 
States v. Murdoch 132 F.3d 534 (10th Cir. 1997). Reber. 2007 UT 36,1flf23-24,171 P.3d 
at 410. Moreover, Mr. Reber had carefully set forth before fee Utah Supreme Court how 
and why Murdock. as well as the related case of Hackford y. Babbitt 14 F.3d 1457 (10th 
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Cir. 1994) are inapplicable to the facts of the Uintah Band. Although both cases addres-
sed both the UPA and the Uintah Band, neither case addressed the effect of the UPA on 
the Uintah Band, as in neither case were the federal courts presented With the raw num-
bers. It is axiomatic that a prior decision cannot be binding precedent on a point not raised 
in the briefs or arguments nor discussed in the court's opinion. United States v. L.A. 
Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33,38,73 S.Ct 67,69,97 L.Ed. 54 (1952). 273, pp. 8-10. 
1. Hackford distinguished. Calvin Hackford argued before the 10th Circuit that he 
had rights as a member of the Uintah Band, independent of the Ute Tribe. Mr. Hackford 
did not ask that court to address the effect of the UPA on the Uintah Band, nor did he ask 
that court to address the consequences of the Ute Tribe expelling three quarters of the 
Uintah Band membership from the Ute Tribe, and he did not present that court with the 
relevant figures. 
The 10th Circuit appropriately restricted itself to the question properly before it. 
The court reviewed the 1937 Ute constitution and a set of 1950 agreements between the 
three bands, and concluded that, as of 1950, the three bands constituted a unified tribe. 
Hackford. 14 F.3d at 1461. The court made no further findings in regard to the Uintah 
Band and explicitly refrained from addressing Mr. Hackford's separate claims regarding 
the Uintah Band, finding that the priority of all water on the reservation dates from the 
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Executive Order of October 3,1861, regardless of band affiliation. 14 F.3d at 1469. 
Having addressed the Uintah Band only through 1^50, the Court then addressed 
the relative effects of the UPA on the "Mixed-bloods" an4 "Full-bloods," apparently 
drawing no connection whatsoever between the "Mixed-bloods" and the Uintah Band. 14 
F.3d at 1461-1464. Nowhere does the opinion remotely suggest that the federal courts 
were ever apprised of any such connection. Had the 10th Circuit been informed that the 
"Mixed-bloods" constituted 76.4% of the Uintah Band, it ^ eems unlikely it would have 
avoided addressing this compelling and decisive issue. 
2. Murdock distinguished. In 1996, Perry Murdock was prosecuted under 18 
U.S.C. §1165 for fishing on tribal lands without a permit, 4nd he appealed his conviction 
to the 10th Circuit. Mr. Murdock was born in 1968 to two parents who were included on 
the termination roll. His first argument before that court w$s simply that he was a member 
of the Ute Tribe, notwithstanding the UPA, and without reference to the Uintah Band. 
The 10th Circuit rejected this argument out of hand. Murdock. 132 F.3d at 540. 
Mr. Murdock then argued that he had rights as a member of the Uintah Band, 
without reference to either the UPA or the expulsion of the Uintah Band from the Ute 
Tribe. Id. The 10th Circuit accordingly dispensed of his argument, likewise without 
reference to either the UPA or the expulsion of the Uintah Uandfrom the Ute Tribe. 
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At no time did Mr. Murdock advise any federal court that the Ute Tribe had 
expelled over three quarters of the Uintah Band in 1956, and nowhere did the 10th Circuit 
address these facts in its ruling. Indeed, the court based its ruling on nothing more than 
the 1937 constitution, without so much as a reference to the subsequent 1950 agreements 
between the three bands. 
With 1937 as its point of departure, it is fair to say that a court could very well 
consider the subsequent effects of the 1954 UP A on the 1937 constitution, and the 
subsequent expulsion of the Uintah Band from the Ute Tribe, without doing violence to 
the 10th Circuit's Murdock reasoning at all. However, that court could not be expected to 
rule on an issue that was not before it. As in Hackford, a review of the record before the 
10th Circuit confirms that court was never apprised that 675 out of 883 members of the 
Uintah Band were expelled from the Ute confederacy under the pretext of the UPA. 
3. Clearly-established Supreme Court precedent. Mr. Clark attempted to establish 
before the trial court that under Article VI of the United States Constitution, as well as 
Article III, §2, of the Utah Constitution, the trial court could not ignore well-established 
principles of Indian law as defined by the United States Supreme Court. 100-103. Those 
canons clearly establish that the Uintah Band must of necessity constitute a separate body 
from the Ute Tribe, and that the Uintah Band has never been terminated from federal 
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supervision: 
a. Any ambiguity in an act affecting Indian rights must be interpreted in favor of 
the Indians against whom the act is directed. "[S]tatutes passed for the benefit of 
dependent Indian tribes are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved 
in favor of the Indians." Alaska Pacific Fisheries Co, v. United States. 248 U.S. 78, 79,39 
S.Ct 40,42,63 LJEd. 138 (1918); see also Brvan v. Itasca County. 426 U.S. 373,392,96 
S.Ct. 2102,2112,48 L.Ed.2d 710 (1976). This is an "eminently sound and vital canon of 
construction." Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast 425 U.S. 649,655, n. 7,96 
S.Ct. 1793,1797, n. 7,48 L.Ed.2d 274 (1976). 100. 
b. Termination is strictly limited to those matters explicitly mentioned in the 
termination act. A termination act cannot be imputed to abrogate treaty rights or terminate 
tribal existence. Moreover, the reach of a termination act oi|ly extends to those rights and 
benefits explicitly mentioned in the act. Menominee Tribe ^ . United States. 391 U.S. 404, 
412-413, 88 S.Ct. 1705, 1711, 20 L.Ed.2d697 (1968). 101. 
c. Any ambiguities in the Ute Partition Act must be qonstrued in favor of those 
affected by the Act, i.e.. the so-called "Mixed-Blood Utes." Under the Supreme Court's 
Menominee decision, any ambiguities in the UPA must be interpreted in favor o/the so-
called "Mixed-blood Utes." United States v. Felter. 752 F.2^ 1505,1511-1512 (10th Cir. 
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1985). Specifically, termination cannot be imputed as to any rights not explicitly men-
tioned in the Act. 752 F.2d at 1512. The Act makes no mention whatsoever of the Uintah 
Band. 101. 
d. Indian tribes are defined by their status as sovereign political entities, not bv 
race. "In dealing with Indians, the federal government is dealing with members or descen-
dants of political entities, that is, Indian tribes, not with persons of a particular race" 
Cohen, Felix S., Handbook of Federal Indian Law. (1982 ed.), p. 19, citing United States 
v. Antelope. 430 U.S. 641,646, 97 S.Ct. 1395,1399, 51 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977)(Emphasis 
added). 
[F]ederal regulation of Indian affairs is not based upon 
impermissible [racial] classifications. Rather, such regulation is rooted in 
the unique status of Indians as "a separate people" with their own political 
institutions. Federal regulation of tribes, therefore, is governance of once-
sovereign political communities; it is not to be viewed as legislation of a 
"'racial' group consisting of'Indians' " 
Id., citing Morton v. MancarL 417 U.S. 535, 553, n.24, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 2484 n. 24, 
41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974). See also Cohen, p. 654. "The Court has also supported its hold-
ings in these cases by characterizing Indians in federal law as apolitical rather than as a 
racial classification. The Court said that Indian laws apply by virtue of tribal membership 
rather than because of the race of the parties." Cohen, p. 655, citing Fisher v. District 
Court. 424 U.S. 382, 390-91, 96 S.Ct. 943, 948,47 L.Ed.2d 106 (1976) (Emphasis 
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added). Morton V, ManearL supra. 101-102. 
In contrast, race, is synonymous with ancestry, or rhore particularly with "blood 
quantum." The Arbitrary Indian. Gail K. Sheffield, Univeitsity of Oklahoma Press, 1997, 
p. 133. It is telling that in setting forth the minimum standards for determining whether a 
community constitutes a federally recognizable Indian trib^, the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
requires only "common Indian ancestry/' but not a minimum blood quantum. 25 C.F.R., 
§83. Indeed, many whole tribes, particularly in the eastern (United States, collectively 
possess less "Indian blood" than does even the most dilute member of the Uintah Band. 
By every conceivable measure, the Uintah Band clearly constitutes an independent and 
pre-existing "sovereign political community." 102. 
e. A tribe consists of the majority of its members. Federal law presumes that a tribe 
consists of the majority of its members. See, e.g., 25 U.S.CJ §§476(a)(l), 476(c), 1300j-
(4)(a)(l), 1300k-6(a)(l), 1321(a), 1322(a), 1326. Moreover^  it is clear that a band that acts 
independently of a tribe is no longer a part of that tribe. Mofctoya v. United States. 180 
U.S. 261, 269-270, 21 S.Ct. 358, 361-362,45 L.Ed. 521 (ISfOl). Since over three quarters 
of the membership of the Uintah Band was expelled from the Ute Tribe under the pretext 
of the UPA, yet the UPA did not (nor could not) obliterate the existence of the Uintah 
Band, the Uintah Band must perforce constitute a separate tribe from the Ute 
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confederacy.106-107. 
f. The power to determine tribal membership is an essential aspect of sovereignty. 
Individual Indian status derives from the status of the tribe. Thus, there can be no Indian 
without a tribe. See Epps v. Andrus. 611 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1979). "The courts have 
consistently recognized that one of an Indians tribe's most basic powers is the authority to 
determine questions of its own membership The power of an Indian tribe to deter-
mine questions of its own membership derives from the character of an Indian tribe as a 
distinct political entity." Cohen, supra, p. 20. See also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez. 
436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct 1670,1684 n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978). 102,108. 
i. The Uintah Band cannot be imputed to ever have surrendered this essential 
aspect of sovereignty. As noted above, ambiguities in acts affecting Indian tribes must be 
interpreted in favor of the Indians affected by those acts. Alaska Pacific Fisheries Co. v. 
United States, supra; Bryan v. Itasca County, supra; Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollow-
breast supra. In order to assert that the Uintah Band has no existence today independent 
of the Ute Tribe, one would have to imply that upon accepting the 1937 Ute Constitution, 
the Uintah Band surrendered this most essential sovereign right to two rival tribes. This is 
contrary to both the most fundamental principles of Indian law, as well as to the facts: 
First, nothing in the Ute Constitution explicitly confers such a right on the 
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confederated tribe. Second, notwithstanding the existence lof the 1937 Constitution, the 
only membership rolls existing prior to 1956 were those kfcpt by the separate bands, and 
nothing in the UPA changes this arrangement. Finally, evejm subsequent to the UP A, 
Congress was still passing legislation pertaining to the Uinfcih Band as separate from the 
Ute Tribe, and recognizing both so-called^// and mixed-Hood individuals as members of 
the Uintah Band. Act of July 14,1956, Pub. L. 717, ch. 603, 70 Stat 546. 
iL Expulsion was an exercise of sovereignty by the pte Tribe. The power of a tribe 
to determine its own membership includes not only the riglit of the Uintah Band to 
recognize Mr. Clark as one of its members, but of equal importance, it includes the Ute 
Tribe's sovereign authority to expel the Uintah Band. 
It is important to understand that this is not an internal dispute between the Ute 
Tribe and a number of its former members, but an interatrial dispute between the Ute 
confederacy on the one hand and a now-separate tribe, the 0intah Band, on the other. The 
UPA authorized the termination of certain individuals from federal supervision and their 
expulsion from the Ute Tribe. That list alone happened to amount to 51.5% of the Uintah 
Band. Under the simple principle of majority identity inherent throughout our entire 
democratic constitutional system, that identification in itself]would have constituted the 
28 
expulsion of the Uintah Band from the Ute Tribe.3 
However, the Ute Tribe went a step further. Independent of any authority granted 
to it under the UPA, the Ute Tribe expelled from its ranks an additional 24.9% of the 
living members of the Uintah Band, many of whom had already been receiving federal 
benefits. Deriving no authority to do so from the UPA, this expulsion could only consti-
tute an exercise of the Ute Tribe's sovereign right to determine its own membership. This 
right would naturally include the power to expel one of the three bands from the 
confederacy. 
In sum, neither Hackford nor Murdock addressed the expulsion of the Uintah Band 
from the Ute Tribe, because in neither case was the 10th Circuit presented with either the 
facts or the argument necessary to address that issue. The question thus remains: How can 
three quarters of the membership of a tribe be expelled from a confederation without 
expelling the tribe itself? Under the guiding U.S. Supreme Court precedents, as well as 
the Ute Tribe's own exercise of its inherent sovereign right to expel any band from its 
confederacy, the only reasonable inference is that the Uintah Band has been expelled 
from the Ute Tribe. 
3
 The Ute Constitution itself would seem to mandate such a result, inasmuch as 
both the Preamble and Article VI, Section 1, of the Ute Constitution acknowledge that the 
tribal constitution is subject to supervening federal law. The UPA would constitute 
precisely such a supervening federal law. 
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C. The Uintah Band as a body has never been terminated from federal supervision. 
A separate question from the expulsion of the Uintah Band from the Ute Tribe is 
whether the Uintah Band has ever been terminated from federal supervision. It is hard to 
see how this could be so when it has never been mentioned in any termination act As has 
already been well-established, termination is strictly limited to those matters set forth in 
the termination act. Menominee, supra. Since Congress has never expressed any intention 
whatsoever to terminate the Uintah Band's eligibility for federal benefits, no such 
intention can be inferred. 107. 
But the inquiry does not stop there. Congress has exjpressly repudiated termination, 
the very pretext under which the Ute Tribe expelled the Uintah Band. "[W]here Congress 
has made its intent clear, we must give effect to that intent.*' Miller v. French. 530 U.S. 
327, 336,120 S.Ct. 2246,2253,147 L.Ed.2d 326 (2000). "As always, we begin with the 
language of the statute and ask whether Congress has spoken on the subject before us. If 
the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; |for the court, as well as the 
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed indent of Congress." Norfolk & 
Western v. American Train Dispatchers Association. 499 U[S. 117,128, 111 S.Ct 1156, 
1163,113 L.Ed.2d 95 (1991). 
Congress has made clear its intent to repudiate termination. The expulsion of the 
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Uintah Band from the Ute Tribe rests upon established and undisputable facts. Once that 
expulsion is acknowledged, the sole question remaining is whether the termination of 
federal supervision over a portion of the Uintah Band's members can be reasonably 
construed to constitute termination of the Uintah Band as a whole. Such a conclusion is 
untenable for a number of reasons: 
1. Identity Theft. As set forth in Hackford, the 1950 agreements permit the whole 
Ute Tribe to exercise the treaty rights originally belonging exclusively to the Uintah 
Band. Hackford. 14 F.3d at 1461,1469. The whole Uintah Band was a party to the 1950 
agreements, and yet the Uintah Band that was party to those agreements consisted almost 
entirely of those persons denominated a mere four years later as "mixed-bloods." Since 
1956, the Ute Tribe has claimed for itself all the rights of the Uintah Band as a political 
unit while aggressively excluding the membership of that unit from its midst. 
To impute termination to the Uintah Band as a whole would thus create the strange 
anomaly of a federally recognized tribe exercising the rights of a terminated tribe still 
living on an existing reservation. In short, imputing termination to the Uintah Band as a 
whole would effectively sanction the biggest case of identity theft in history. This is in 
fact what has been going on. 
What does the Uintah Band consist of if not its membership? Congress has never 
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presumed to possess the power to separate a tribe's identiljy from its members. "Our 
decisions, while recognizing that the government has powfcr to control and manage the 
property and affairs of its Indian wards in good faith for tfyeir welfare, show that this 
power is subject to constitutional limitations and does not enable the government to give 
the lands of one tribe or band to another, or to deal with tfyem as its own." Chippewa 
Indians of Minnesota v. United States, 301 U.S. 358, 375-^76, 57 S.Ct 826, 833, 81 
L.Ed. 1156 (1937)(Emphasis added). 
2. Deprivation of Due Process. 23.6% of the Uintah Band remained enrolled in the 
Ute Tribe. If the 455 Uintah Band members on the termination roll are factored out, those 
Uintahs living at the time who were expelled from the Ute tribe outside the authority of 
the UPA would constitute 51.4% of the Band, leaving 48.6% of the Uintah Band enrolled 
in the Ute Tribe. On the other hand, if the 220 Uintah Band ljnembers excluded from both 
rolls are factored out, the 455 constitute 68.6% of the band, leaving 31.4% enrolled in the 
Ute Tribe. No matter how one views the figures, imputing termination to the Uintah Band 
as a political unit would effectively terminate the treaty rights of the small minority of 
Uintah members who nevertheless remained members of the tJte Tribe and the 24.9% of 
the Band who were never included on either Ute roll. How could these two groups be 
stripped of federal recognition without offending the principl0s of Due Process? 
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3. Termination of the Uintah Band is outside the scope of the UPA. In short, the 
UPA itself has failed of its essential purpose, and Congress has clearly and unambiguous-
ly expressed its intent with regard to all termination acts. A state ruling (Reber) that is so 
at odds with clearly established federal precedent must be challenged. Young v. Sirmons, 
486 F.3d 655 (10th Cir. 2007) "If a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court must 
interpret the statute to effect the unambiguous intent of Congress, regardless of the 
interpretation given to the statute by an administrative agency with responsibility for 
enforcement." Mt. Emmons Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1167, 1170 (10th Cir. 1997). 
Prior to 1937, the Uintah Band clearly constituted a tribe separately acknowledged 
by the United States. After 1937, it clearly retained that recognition under the penumbra 
of the confederated Ute Tribe. Thus, the Uintah Band has not been excluded from the list 
of tribes eligible under 25 U.S.C. §479a due to any failure to qualify, nor to having been 
terminated, but merely because no court has ever acknowledged its subsequent expulsion 
from the Ute confederacy. 
The question is not one of challenging or invalidating the UPA, but of simply 
addressing matters that are and always have remained outside its scope. The UPA did not 
mandate expulsion of the Uintah Band. It simply did so de facto, by sheer weight of 
numbers, and the Ute Tribe zealously extended that expulsion, solely under the pretext of 
33 
the UPA. The UPA did not mandate termination of the Uintah Band. However, the Ute 
Tribe, the State of Utah, and indeed, even the Secretary of (the Interior have treated the 
vast majority of Uintah Band members as terminated, regardless of whether they were 
among the 455. This, too, was done under the pretext of th0 UPA, not under its actual 
terms. Finally, the UPA never mandated that the name, rights, and identity of the Uintah 
Band be taken from its membership and given to two rival tribes. This was done under a 
pretext. It's time for the pretext to end. 
D. The Uintah Band continues to maintain a traditioHtal form of government. 
It is important to understand the significance of the HJintah Band being expelled 
from the Ute Tribe. Once that expulsion has taken place, it IJLO longer matters how the Ute 
Constitution defines tribal membership or how many members of the Uintah Band sit on 
the Business Committee. They do not govern the Uintah Band. By analogy, the 
Commonwealth of Virginia can continue to seat in its legislature as many representatives 
from the State of West Virginia as it likes. That does not mal^ e West Virginia any less of a 
sovereign state, nor does it give the Commonwealth any authority whatsoever over those 
forty former western counties. 
It is also important to understand that no confederated!Ute Tribe existed until the 
1937 constitution was adopted under the Indian Reorganization Act. The IRA was an 
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attempt by the federal government to bring a halt to the ravages of the allotment program 
undertaken from the 1880fs onward, and to restore a measure of independence to Indian 
tribes. Under the IRA, tribes were encouraged to adopt tribal constitutions and to 
incorporate as business entities. The policy has subsequently come under heavy criticism: 
The Act itself continues to be viewed controversially in Indian 
country as another example of the imposition of "white man's law and 
standards." This view is somewhat ironic given the Act's supposed 
commitment to tribal self-government. Critics find support in the fact that 
the tribal constitutions and tribal corporate charters adopted pursuant to the 
legislation were, in most instances, prepared in advance by the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs and reflected little, if any, tribal input and retained 
substantial review authority within the BIA. 
Frank Pommersheim and Terry Pechota, Tribal Immunity. Tribal Courts, and the 
Federal System: Emerging Contours and Frontiers. 31 SJD.L.Rev. 553 (1986), p. 556. See 
also Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law. 1982 ed. pp. 149-150. 
The biggest criticism of the IRA is that it ignored traditional tribal systems of 
government, which had been based on consensus and heredity. Robert B. Porter, 
Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty through Government Reform: What are the Issues? 7 
Kan. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 72 (1997), pp. 74-76; Eric Lemont, Developing Effective 
Processes of American Indian Tribal Constitutional and Governmental Reform: From the 
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma. Hualapai Nation, Navajo Nation, and Northern Chevenne 
Tribe. 26 Am. Indian L. Rev. 147 (2001), pp. 152-155. 
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While some tribes rejected the IRA constitutions entirely, and some managed to 
create a system in which both traditional and IRA-imposed systems coexisted, the 
majority of tribes simply acquiesced to the IRA strictures 4t the expense of traditional 
government. Robert D. Cooter, Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role of 
Custom in American Indian Tribal Court. 46 Am. J. Compj L. 287 (1998), p. 321. 
Perhaps few tribes illustrate the failures of the IRA as well as does the Ute Tribe. 
Prior to 1937, each of the three bands, the Uintahs, the Whjterivers, and the Uncompahgre 
Utes, was governed by a traditional tribal government. Whfri the three bands imited under 
the IRA in 1937, those traditional governments were eclipsed. However, the traditional 
tribal governments were never abolished. They were simply ignored. When the Uintah 
Band was expelled from the Ute Tribe, the people of necessity reverted back to their 
traditional form of clan representation. Those clans have never ceased to exist. They have 
never ceased to have tribal elders to attend tribal gatherings.) However, given the 
horrendous destruction of identity the Uintah Band has faced under the Ute Partition Act, 
as evidenced by at least three thorough studies on the subject,4 it should come as no 
surprise that the Uintah Band has been reluctant to expose it$ traditional tribal 
government to public annihilation. 
4See Metcalf, Nielson, Wilkinson, supra, p. 9, para. 17. 
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n. The trial court erred by imposing sanctions on Mr. Clark's trial counsel. 
Rule 3.1, Utah Rules of Professional Conduct: 
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or 
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing 
so that is not frivolous, which includes a good-faith argument for an 
extension, modification or reversal of existing law. 
Rule 3.3(a), Utah Rules of Professional Conduct: 
A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling 
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the 
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel. 
Mr. Clark's rights as an Indian fall exclusively within the province of federal law. 
"[T]he protection that federal law, treaties, and statutes extend to Indian occupancy is 
'exclusively the province of federal law.9" Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway. 286 F.3d 1195, 
1203 (10th Cir. 2002), citing Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe. 442 U.S. 653,670-671,99 
S.Ct. 2529,2539, 61 L.Ed.2d 153 (1979), quoting Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. 
County of Oneida. 414 U.S. 661,670, 94 S.Ct 772, 779, 39LEd.2d 73 (1974). 
Thus, if the state courts do not recognize Mr. Clark's rights, he will ultimately 
need to take this case into federal court, either on a petition to the U.S. Supreme Court for 
writ of certiorari, or by a habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. §2254. In either case, it is 
well-established that a petitioner before the federal courts cannot raise a federal issue that 
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was not first raised before the state trial court. Hiner v. Defere & Co., 340 F.3d 1190, 1196 
(10th Cir. 1998); Yellowbear v. Wyoming Att'v General 5^5 F.3d 921 (10th Cir. 2008). 
The trial court was fully aware that the Uintah Bandl had already petitioned the 
U.S. Supreme Court to review the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Reber. The trial court 
was specifically aware that the U.S. Supreme Court had defied certiorari, and that Mr. 
Clark was creating a record to pursue a collateral federal challenge to the Reber ruling. 
087-089. Mr. Clark thus cited the appropriate federal prece4ents in his motion to dismiss 
before the trial court (092-130), and the State responded by siting the Utah Supreme 
Court's Reber ruling. 144. Thus the requirements of both Rujles 3.1 and 3.3(a)(2) of the 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct were folly complied with. 
There was no factual violation of any ethical rules. Thus, under the three-tiered 
approach set forth in Morse v. Packer. (1) the trial court's factual finding was clearly 
erroneous; (2) the court's legal conclusion based on that erroneous finding was in error; 
and (3) with no factual or legal basis, any sanction whatsoever would constitute an abuse 
of discretion. 15 P.3d 1021,1025, 2000 UT 86, ^ [16. The sanction should therefore be 
reversed. 
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HI. The trial judge should have been disqualified due to manifest bias. 
As a general rule, a judge has a duty to preserve the integrity and 
independence of the judiciary and should disqualify herself in a proceeding 
in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The word 
"reasonable" connotes the idea that judges are not subject to 
disqualification in every situation where there impartiality is questioned, 
particularly when the potential for bias is remote Scholars discussing 
this principle have described it as the "reasonable person" test. This test 
looks to see whether a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, 
would believe that the judge's impartiality could be questioned," 
West Jordan City v. Goodman, 135 P.3d 874, 880, 2006 UT 27. "A judge should 
recuse himself when his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." State v. Neely, 748 
P.2d 1091,1094 (Utah 1994), cert, denied, 487 U.S. 1220, 108 S.Ct 2876,101 L.Ed.2d 
911 (1988). "Obviously, actual bias need not be found to support disqualification. An 
appearance of bias or prejudice is sufficient for disqualification . . . We note that 
disqualification due to the appearance of bias or prejudice seems more amenable to 
prospective application." Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. 767 P.2d 538, 
544, n. 5 (Utah 1988). 
Under Rule 29(c)(3)(B), a reviewing judge must assign another judge if the 
affidavits in support of a motion to disqualify are legally sufficient. Judge Anderson erred 
in finding the affidavits insufficient, applying criteria unsupported by any rule or caselaw. 
Contrary to Judge Anderson's finding, all of the supporting affidavits were based on 
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personal knowledge. The issue before the court was JudgelPayne's bias, as demonstrated 
by a consistent pattern over a period of years and years. Contrary to Judge Anderson's 
observation, the issue in those prior cases was identical to ^ he issue in the present case, 
i.e., prejudice against Indians in general and members of the Uintah Band in particular. 
Indeed, it is hard to see how affidavits demonstrating bias 4ould ever refer to anything 
other than "entirely separate matters" when a motion to disqualify must be filed within 20 
days after a judge is assigned to the case. The affidavit of counsel refers to specific 
conduct witnessed in the courtroom. Since the rule calls for affidavits, it is not clear in 
what other form Judge Anderson would have the relevant appellate cases brought to a 
reviewing judge's attention. Those cases are mentioned to demonstrate that Judge Payne's 
bias is nothing new, and has been preserved for the record aftd raised as an issue in prior 
cases. 
On the one hand, Judge Anderson finds that the allegations by eyewitnesses are 
merely "hearsay." On the other hand, his ruling suggests that| facts demonstrating bias that 
were part of a prior court record and were challenged on appeal cannot be relied upon 
either. Between these two extremes, it would thus appear to be impossible to bring any 
allegation of bias that Judge Anderson would consider legally sufficient. 
"[F]or alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying [fy] must... result in an 
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opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his 
participation in the case." United States v. Grinnell Corp.. 384 U.S. 563, 583, 86 S.Ct 
1698,1710,16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966). Disqualification is warranted "when it appear[s] that, 
apart from the judge's analysis of the issues of fact or law, he had such a bias in favor of 
one party or prejudice against the other that he could not fairly and impartially determine 
the issues." Orderville Irrigation Co. v. Glendale Irrigation Co., 17 Utah 2d 282,288,409 
P.2d 616,621 (Utah 1965). 
The affidavits demonstrated that Judge Payne is biased against members of the 
Uintah Band. The appellate record, and particularly his sanctioning of counsel in the 
present case, demonstrate that he consistently decides Indian jurisdiction issues on bases 
other than those presented to him in the briefs. This is the very definition of bias, and the 
judge should have been disqualified. 
CONCLUSION 
The State was without jurisdiction to prosecute Mr. Clark, and this was properly 
brought to the trial court's attention. The sanction imposed against counsel for bringing 
the motion was improper, and was based entirely upon the prejudice and bias of the trial 
judge. The conviction of Mr. Clark and the sanction against his counsel should both be 
reversed. 
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